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RECONCILING TWOMBLY AND PATENT 





To survive dismissal, a pleading in civil cases must contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”1 
Emphasizing what it takes to be a “showing” of entitlement to relief, the 
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 adopted the “plausibility” 
standard and overruled the “no set of facts” standard established in Conley v. 
Gibson, under which the pleading of facts is not required.3 The Court in Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal later expanded the application of the Twombly standard to all civil cases 
under Rule 8.4 
Nonetheless, the current pleading practice in patent infringement cases 
does not adhere to Twombly’s plausibility standard. Rather, patent practice 
continues to follow “Form 18” in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules, 
which sets forth a sample complaint requiring only the statement and allegation 
of jurisdiction, patent number, date of patent, infringing activity, and relief.5 
This continued practice has been endorsed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which has held that “Form 18 would control in the event of a 
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 1 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–57 (2007). 
 3 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). 
 4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 18. 
 




conflict between the form and Twombly and Iqbal.”6 Tellingly, a recently 
proposed bill in Congress would, if enacted, mandate a revision of Form 18.7 
This paper explores the patent pleading standard as it stands now, delving 
into the disparity between, and how to reconcile, Twombly and patent pleadings. 
Part I revisits why and how Twombly raised the pleading standard and called for 
“plausibility” with emphasis on the meaning of “showing” in Rule 8. Part II 
reviews how lower courts handling patent infringement have interpreted Form 
18 in light of Twombly. Finally, Part III explores how patent pleadings and 
Twombly can be reconciled. 
I. WHY TWOMBLY RAISED THE STANDARD: THE “SHOWING” OF RULE 8 
& DISCOVERY ABUSE 
Rule 8 provides in relevant part that “[a] pleading that states a claim for 
relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”8 Two motivating forces were behind the 1938 
addition of Rule 8: the “notice pleading” principle and the “uniformity” purpose. 
The former hinges on whether sufficient allegations are pled to put the defendant 
on “fair notice.”9 The latter is related to the overarching purpose of Rule 8 to 
establish “a uniform system for all [civil] cases,”10 unless specifically carved out 
for the heightened standard under Rule 9, such as pleading fraud.11  
Twombly grapples with a threshold level of factual details set forth on the 
face of a complaint. Special attention by the Court was directed to the 
incoherency between “fair notice” and Conley, particularly its “no set of facts” 
language. Importantly, in overruling the “no set of facts” standard, Twombly 
emphasized the meaning of “showing” in Rule 8 as well as the danger of 
“discovery abuse.” 
A. Twombly’s Efforts to Reconcile Conley and Rule 8 
Before Twombly, Conley governed the notice pleading regime for five 
decades. In Conley, black railroad workers were fired, and they alleged that the 
union refused to protect them against the wrongful discharge in violation of its 
  
 6 K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013).  
 7 Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2(c) (2013) (“Not later than 
12 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Supreme Court shall review and 
amend Form 18 . . . to ensure that Form 18 is consistent with the requirements under 
section 281A of title 35.”). 
 8 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 9 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).  
 10 Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 11 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
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statutory duty to represent employees fairly.12 The union countered that these 
allegations were insufficient for Rule 8; however, the Supreme Court did not 
accept the union’s argument, reasoning that if those allegations were proven, 
there would be a manifest breach of the union’s duty.13 
Conley went so far as to say that “a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim.”14 If bound by this “no set of facts” 
standard, courts can dismiss a complaint “only when proceeding to discovery or 
beyond would be futile.”15 When Twombly was litigated, the “no set of facts” 
standard was firmly in place as Conley had been cited in more than ten opinions 
of the Supreme Court.16 However, the legacy of Conley did not stop the Court 
from overruling the “no set of facts” standard in Twombly. 
1. Conley’s “No Set of Facts” Language and Parallel Conduct in Twombly 
It is of note that Twombly did not question the legitimacy of Conley in its 
entirety; only the “no set of facts” language was targeted. In reconciling Rule 8 
and Conley, the Court highlighted what it takes to be a “showing” for the 
purpose of “fair notice.” In Twombly, plaintiffs brought class actions, asking 
treble damages for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.17 One of the 
antitrust violations alleged against service provider defendants involved 
“parallel conduct” in their service areas as a way to suppress the growth of new 
business rivals.18 
In Twombly, the Court sought to dissociate the allegations of “parallel 
conduct” from the “showing” and “fair notice” requirements under Rule 8. It 
first articulated from Conley that the essence of pleading is to give fair notice 
about factual allegations on which the claims rest.19 Having characterized “a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” as inconsistent with 
fair notice, the Court mulled over three choices concerning the required level of 
  
 12 Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. 
 13 Id. at 43, 45–46. 
 14 Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
 15 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 16 Id. at 577 n.4 (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818 (2002); Davis v. Monroe 
Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764, 811 (1993); Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989); Hughes v. Rowe, 
449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 
246 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex 
Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. 
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972); Jenkins v. 
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422 (1969)). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
 18 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. And the second count was a conspiracy by agreeing to 
refrain from competing against one another. See id. at 551. 
 19 Id. at 555. 
 




factual allegation: “probable,” “plausible,” and “possible.”20 It concluded that 
the requirement should be more than a “possibility,” but need not be 
“probable.”21 Consequently, the threshold level of pleading in compliance with 
fair notice is set to require factual allegations to be “plausible” that discovery 
will reveal evidence.22 
In light of this “plausibility” standard, the Court held that a bare assertion 
of parallel conduct, without additional factual showing, “stops short of the line 
between possibility and plausibility.”23 The Court labeled the defendants’ 
parallel conduct as consistent not only with an illegal agreement, but also with a 
legitimate, independent decision in the hope of keeping regional dominance of 
their own.24 Given the neutral view taken by the Court as to parallel conduct, it 
concluded that the complaint should have contained a higher factual “showing” 
of conduct in furtherance of the illegal conspiracy. 
However, Twombly’s plausibility standard conflicts directly with 
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, because “the pleading standard [under 
Conley] . . . does not require, or even invite the pleading of facts.”25 In response, 
likening “no set of facts” to “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action,” Twombly tried to put Conley in perspective.26 Instead of dismissing it 
outright, Twombly cautioned against the liberal reading of the “no set of facts” 
language, because such reading would “dispense with any showing” of factual 
allegations, contrary to the text of Rule 8.27 
In so reconciling Rule 8 and Conley, Twombly was faithful to the judicial 
maxim that “general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection 
with the case in which these expressions are used.”28 Targeting only the “no set 
of facts” language, Twombly did not attempt to undermine the adequacy of 
Conley’s disposition because Conley’s factual allegations were sufficient to put 
the defendant on fair notice.29 It merely called into question the isolated meaning 
  
 20 Id. at 555–57. 
 21 Id. at 556. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 557. In reaching such conclusion, Twombly cited antitrust precedents and 
leading commentators in support of that conclusion. See id. at 554 (“[P]roof of a § 1 
conspiracy must include evidence tending to exclude the possibility of independent 
action.” (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)); see also 
id. at 555–56 (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 24 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567–68. 
 25 Id. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 26 Id. at 555 (majority opinion). 
 27 Id. at 562 (emphasis added).  
 28 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 399 (1821). 
 29 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (“To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage 
should be understood in light of the opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s 
concrete allegations.”). 
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of “no set of facts,” saying it has been “puzzling the profession for 50 years.”30 
Viewed in light of Conley’s concrete allegations of facts regarding the breach of 
the union’s duty,31 Twombly concluded, the “no set of facts” language in Conley 
cannot add up to the pleading standard.32 
2. The Fact-Law Dichotomy in Characterizing Allegations of a Complaint 
It may sound strict to require plausibility at the outset of proceedings;33 
however, the Court brushed off a risk of false acquittal because every allegation 
in a complaint, however doubtful, will be accepted as “true.”34 But Twombly 
added one important caveat to the characterization of each allegation contained 
in a complaint. In testing the sufficiency of plausibility, Twombly announced 
that it will consider only “factual” allegations and disregard mere “legal” 
conclusions.35 It ruled, upon review of the Twombly complaint, that the 
defendants’ “conspiracy” in restraint of trade and agreements not to compete are 
mere legal conclusions resting on the factual allegations regarding parallel 
conduct.36 Because legal conclusions are being set aside, and parallel conduct 
alone is factually neutral,37 the Court held that the complaint was insufficient to 
state a claim to relief.38 
Later the Court in Iqbal affirmed the fact-law dichotomy, stating that 
“[w]e begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth.”39 Any contribution that legal conclusions 
can make to a pleading inquiry is limited to “provid[ing] the framework of a 
complaint.”40 Thus, what is outcome-determinative in Rule 12(b)(6) motions are 
factual allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom, which collectively must 
raise a plausible showing of entitlement to relief.  
  
 30 Id. at 563. 
 31 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 32 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
 33 See, e.g., id. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[The Conley] Court would have 
understood the majority’s remodeling of its language to express an evidentiary standard, 
which the Conley Court had neither need nor want to explicate.”). 
 34 Id. at 555 (majority opinion). 
 35 See id. at 555, 564. 
 36 Id. at 564-65. 
 37 See id. at 557 n.5 (“[Parallel conduct] lies between the factually neutral and the 
factually suggestive.”). 
 38 Id. at 570. 
 39 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 40 Id. at 679. 
 




B. Twombly’s Main Concern: Discovery Abuse 
Twombly was mindful of the glitch that an “imperfect judicial system” 
can distort otherwise healthy competition in the marketplace.41 Throughout the 
opinion, the Court’s overarching concern was expressly directed to the 
“enormous expense” of antitrust discovery and the possibility of “discovery 
abuse” by a private plaintiff’s non-meritorious claim.42 If faced with such high 
cost of litigation and discovery, antitrust defendants will likely be forced to 
calculate all the risk and resources involved, and non-sophisticated defendants 
are likely to find it cheaper to settle than to fight. 
Besides, treble damages available under the Sherman Act43 might lure 
plaintiffs with a weak case to push forward a private grievance before the 
courts.44 However, antitrust laws were never intended to penalize a monopoly 
position acquired “merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and 
industry.”45 Moreover, antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition, not 
competitors.46 
Such inherent uncertainties over the dividing line between harm to 
competition and harm to competitors, coupled with a risk of discovery abuse, 
were shoving the Twombly Court in the direction of elevating the burden of 
pleading antitrust claims.47 On these policy grounds, Twombly declared that 
“basic deficiency [in pleadings] should be . . . exposed at the point of minimum 
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.”48 
Relatedly, Twombly delegated into the hands of district courts “the power 
to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive 
  
 41 Paul H. Saint-Antoine, IP, Antitrust, and the Limits of First Amendment Immunity: 
Shouting “Injunction” in a Crowded Courthouse, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG. 41, 45 
(2013). 
 42 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he threat of [enormous] discovery expense will 
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those 
proceedings.”). 
 43 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (“[A]ny [injured] person . . . shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee.”) (emphasis added).  
 44 But cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Sherman Act’s awarding treble damages and attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs 
indicates that Congress intended to encourage private enforcement of antitrust laws). 
 45 United States v. Aluminum Co. (Alcoa) of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).  
 46 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (“The 
antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the protection of competition not competitors.”) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47 See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The 
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 n.28 (2012). 
 48 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1216, at 
233–34) (emphasis added). 
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factual controversy to proceed.”49 Later, the Court in Iqbal demanded judicial 
flexibility in examining all civil pleadings, stating that “[d]etermining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task 
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.”50 
Finally, Twombly left a hint at the end of the opinion, anticipating the 
criticism that only causes of action under Rule 9 are subject to any “heightened” 
pleading standard: 
On certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a 
plaintiff must state factual allegations with greater particularity than Rule 
8 requires. Here, our concern is not that the allegations in the complaint 
were insufficiently “particular[ized]”; rather, the complaint warranted 
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief 
plausible.51  
Here, the Court’s preemptive answer is that the potential criticism does 
not fully understand the Court’s premise that “particularity” is not a synonym of 
“plausibility.” For this reason, the important lesson for lower courts and 
practitioners is that the Supreme Court will keep close watch on “a high risk of 
abusive litigation” in the form of discovery abuse, and in civil cases under Rule 
8, with the “plausibility” tool at hands. 
C. Justice Stevens’ Dissent and Form 9 at Play 
Justice Stevens expressed strong allegiance to Conley’s legitimacy in its 
entirety. Taking issue with the majority’s fact-law dichotomy,52 Justice Stevens 
argued that Rule 8 was designed to avoid the law-versus-fact reference, 
recognizing the difficulty in distinguishing “statements of fact” from 
“conclusions of law.”53  
Justice Stevens added a powerful piece to his logical force. Arguing that 
it is illustrative of what drafters of Rule 8 envisioned, Justice Stevens cited to 
Form 9 (now Form 11): “On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston 
Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle 
against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.”54 Since negligent driving 
  
 49 Id. (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
528 n.17 (1983)). 
 50 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 51 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 52 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 53 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54 Id. at 576 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 9 (2006) (renumbered FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 
11)). 
 




is a mere “legal” conclusion, Justice Stevens continued, Twombly will render 
useless Form 9 against the drafter’s intent.55 
The majority did not lose sight of the problems aroused by Justice 
Stevens’ citation to Form 9. In response, the majority sought to embrace, not 
dodge, the legitimacy of Form 9,56 finding it consistent with a “showing” of 
Rule 8. Unlike Form 9’s delineation of facts concerning a car accident including 
the time, place, and persons involved, the majority characterized the Twombly 
complaint as lacking such specificity of Form 9 with regard to the alleged 
meetings and conspiracies.57  
Consequently, defendants in Twombly were left with no clue as to where 
to begin and what to answer.58 To the majority, this factual insufficiency of the 
Twombly complaint, if left unchecked, would be jeopardizing the hallmark of 
pleading—”fair notice.” To put the defendant on fair notice, the majority again 
emphasized that a complaint must possess a factual “showing” of entitlement to 
relief that is plausible on its face.59 A blanket assertion of entitlement to relief 
not only adds little to that “showing,” but also runs counter to the spirit of “fair 
notice.”60 
Importantly, even Justice Stevens did not disagree with the importance of 
“fair notice” and the meaning of “showing” under Rule 8.61 Thereafter, 
Twombly’s rule based on fair notice and a showing of entitlement to relief has 
not been questioned by the judiciary. Given this acknowledgment of “fair 
notice” in civil pleadings, the current pleading practice in patent infringement 
cases is a surprising turnout.  
II. FORM 18 AND POSSIBLE ABUSES OF PATENT PLEADINGS 
Along with Form 9, the Appendix to the Federal Rules provides a sample 
complaint for patent infringement in Form 18. Because the Federal Circuit has 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent law appeals,62 the mission of interpreting 
Twombly in patent cases is up to the Federal Circuit. In the face of Twombly and 
  
 55 See id. at 575–576. 
 56 Id. at 555 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 57 Id. at 565 n.10. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 555 n.3. 
 60 See id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1202, at 95) (noting that Rule 8 
does not authorize a pleader’s “bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it”). 
 61 Compare id. at 555 n.3 (the majority), with id. at 580 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The majority is correct to say that what the Federal Rules require is a showing of 
entitlement to relief.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 62 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
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Iqbal,63 the Federal Circuit apparently unlocks the door of discovery to a 
plaintiff who is armed with Form 18.64 A particular group of patent holders, 
Patent Assertion Entities, are uniquely situated to gain the maximum benefit 
afforded by the lower pleading standards of Form 18. However, a closer 
examination of both antitrust and patent infringement cases reveals a shared 
characteristic of a high risk of abusive litigation and discovery abuse. 
A. Patent Pleadings in Practice Post Twombly & Iqbal 
Form 18 requires the following information: 
(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff owns the 
patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing the patent “by 
making, selling, and using [the device] embodying the patent”; (4) a 
statement that the plaintiff has given the defendant notice of its 
infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction and damages.65 
As such, Form 18 fails to bear out the “all element rule” of patent 
infringement that every element in the claim must be present in the accused 
device. In alleging that the accused device is “embodying the patented 
invention,” Form 18 provides no specifics of how that device is infringing which 
claim of the patent.66 
In the course of interpreting Form 18, the Federal Circuit at first viewed 
Form 18 as compliant with Twombly in a pro se case, which led to confusion in 
the district courts. Later, the Federal Circuit departed from Twombly, on the 
matter of direct infringement, by electing to endorse the legitimacy of Form 18 
over Twombly. 
1. Form 18 and Pro Se Litigants: McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. 
Several months after Twombly but before Iqbal, the Federal Circuit was 
faced with a task of reconciling Twombly and Form 18 (then Form 16).67 In 
McZeal, a pro se litigant sued Sprint for patent infringement, and the district 
  
 63 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (announcing that the Twombly standard 
is controlling “in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts” 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)). 
 64 Cf. id. at 678–79. 
 65 McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (alteration in 
original) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 16 (2006) (renumbered FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 18)). 
 66 Id. at 1360 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 67 When McZeal was decided, the patent infringement pleading form appeared in 
Form 16. FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 16 (2006). The Forms were updated in 2007, and now the 
old Form 16 is renumbered, with substantially identical contents, as “Form 18.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. FORM 18. 
 




court granted Sprint’s motion to dismiss, remarking that the complaint was 
“irreparable because . . . [t]here just aren’t any facts.”68 
The Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal. As an initial matter, the court 
resolved the jurisdictional question, announcing that “[a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] 
is a purely procedural question not pertaining to patent law” and therefore on 
review should “apply the law of the regional circuit.”69 But, at first blush, a 
perplexity arises because the court could have added that review of patent law 
questions embodied in the pleading is subject to Federal Circuit law.70 Here, the 
Federal Circuit seems to draw the line to distance itself from substantive patent 
law questions embodied in patent pleadings. 
An important premise in McZeal was that the plaintiff was acting pro se, 
and hence, was entitled to less stringent pleading standards.71 The court then 
endeavored to weave Form 18 into Twombly’s mandate of “fair notice,”72 by 
emphasizing that Twombly in fact approved Form 9 and did not change the 
pleading standard as articulated in Conley.73 It concluded that a patent complaint 
is not required to include each element of a patent claim because Form 18, like 
Form 9, can put defendants on enough notice.74 
Dissenting in part, Judge Dyk argued that the majority’s position is 
inconsistent with Twombly because Form 18 cannot pass the plausibility test for 
failure to state both the patent claim being asserted and how an infringing 
activity reads on the asserted claim.75 Also, Judge Dyk pointed out that allowing 
“conclusory allegations” under Form 18 to go beyond the pleading stage would 
expose defendants to “extensive discovery.”76 
Despite his open criticism to the consequence of approving Form 18, 
however, Judge Dyk agreed that Rule 84, which provides that “[t]he forms in the 
Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that 
these rules contemplate,”77 forces judicial hands to find Form 18 sufficient per 
  
 68 McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1355. 
 69 Id. at 1355–56. 
 70 See Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin, Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 
1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e will apply our own law to both substantive and 
procedural issues intimately involved in the substance of enforcement of the patent 
right.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 71 McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1356. 
 72 See id. at 1357 (“[A] patentee need only plead facts sufficient to place the alleged 
infringer on notice as to what he must defend.” (emphasis added)). 
 73 See id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007)); see 
also id. at 1356 n.4 (“Bell Atlantic favorably quoted Conley.”). 
 74 Id. at 1357; see also supra Part I.C. 
 75 See McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1360 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 76 Id. at 1362; see also supra Part I.B. 
 77 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (emphasis added).  
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se.78 Instead, having recognized the irreconcilable gap between Twombly and 
Form 18, Judge Dyk called congressional attention to Form 18.79 
The majority’s position that Form 18 conforms to Twombly was based on 
the recognition that a pro se litigant is held to the lower pleading bar, although 
the Federal Circuit did not forget to pen admonition against McZeal’s 
“voluminous” experience however short of sophistication.80 On remand, the 
district court in defiance of the Federal Circuit dismissed the complaint again,81 
and the Federal Circuit affirmed that judgment albeit on a different ground.82 But 
the district court in McZeal was not alone in its want for guidance. 
2. Sharp Divisions in District Courts over the Sufficiency of Form 18 
McZeal caused a lack of uniformity at the trial court level. A good 
example is district courts in California. First, in Bender v. LG Electronics 
U.S.A., Inc., the court called for a plausible claim in accordance with Twombly, 
ruling that to put accused infringers on notice, a patentee must specifically 
identify an allegedly infringing product, such as “by name or number,” and 
plead factual allegations to plausibly show infringement.83 It found McZeal 
unhelpful to patentees because Iqbal abrogated McZeal or at least because 
McZeal was a pro se case.84 Other district courts in different jurisdictions 
expressly declined to follow McZeal and Form 18, taking the position that 
  
 78 McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1360.  
 79 See id. (“One can only hope that the rulemaking process will eventually result in 
eliminating the form, or at least in revising it to require [the specifics of] allegations.”). 
 80 See id. at 1358 (“By ruling in McZeal’s favor, we do not condone his method of 
pleading.”); see also id. at 1359 n.2 (Dyk, J., concurring in part) (“McZeal is familiar 
with pleading requirements, and, in my view, should not benefit from the usual liberal 
reading given to pro se litigants.”). 
 81 McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. (McZeal II), 335 F. Appx 966, 967–68 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (quoting the district judge’s remarks that “I’m actually comfortable simply holding 
the same way I held last time”; the remand is “absurd”; and “I was obliged by a gross 
error in the Court of Appeals to readdress the case”). 
 82 Id. at 969 (affirming the dismissal for want of prosecution in failing to comply with 
the court order). 
 83 Bender v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-02114 JF (PVT), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33075, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010); see also Bender v. Nat’l Semiconductor 
Corp., No. C 09-01151 JSW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113506, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 
2009); Tseng v. Marukai Corp. U.S.A., No. SACV 09-0968 AG (RNBx), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 112124, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009); AntiCancer Inc. v. Xenogen Corp., 248 
F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. Cal. 2007).  
 84 See LG Elecs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33075, at *9–11, *11 n.3; see also 
Medsquire LLC v. Spring Med. Sys. Inc., No. 2:11-cv-04504-JHN-PLA, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 107416, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011). 
 




Twombly and Iqbal practically invalidated Form 18.85 Even a pro se litigant 
could not survive the court’s searching inquiry for a plausible claim.86 
To the contrary, other district court decisions in California took the side 
of McZeal, holding that allegations conforming to Form 18 are enough for 
pleading purposes.87 Others including the Eastern District Court of Texas joined 
this group. For example, in Traffic Information, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., the court 
opined that “Twombly and Iqbal have not affected the adequacy of complying 
with Form 18.”88  
Several other decisions found it dispositive that Form 18 only provides a 
template for direct infringement, such that Twombly is binding only in indirect 
infringement cases.89 Under this approach, causes of action as set forth in and 
conforming to the Appendix of Forms will suffice per se, whereas those not 
listed there are subject to Twombly’s more demanding standard. This is the point 
  
 85 See, e.g., Rovi Corp. v. Hulu, LLC, No. 11-665, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10183, at 
*6–7 (D. Del. Jan. 27, 2012); Tyco Fire Prods, LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 
905 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Elektromanufaktur Zangenstein Hanauer 
GmbH & Co. KGaA, No. 11-CV-262-JPS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137985, at *6–7 (E.D. 
Wis. Nov. 30, 2011).  
 86 See Pieczenik v. Abbott Labs., No. 10-2230, 2011 WL 1045347, at *20, *27 
(D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2011), aff’d, 474 F. App’x 766 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 87 See Bender v. Nokia Inc., No. C-09-1247 MMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92482, at 
*1–2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2009); accord Advanced Analogic Techs., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs., 
Inc., No. C-09-1360 MMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57953, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009); 
see also Apple Inc. v. Eforcity Corp., No. 5:10-cv-03216 JF (HRL), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39644, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2011) (citing McZeal as case-dispositive); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(finding Form 18 sufficient). But see LG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33075, at *15 (noting 
that Nokia did not discuss the sufficiency of the factual allegations in light of Twombly 
and Iqbal).  
 88 Traffic Info., LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 2:09-CV-246-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 2545500, 
at *7 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2010) (quoting Bedrock Computer Techs., LLC v. Softlayer 
Techs., Inc., No. 609 CV 269, 2010 WL 5175172, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2010)); see 
also Clear with Computers, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. 6:09 CV 479, 2010 
WL 3155885, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2010) (dismissing Hyundai’s argument that 
Twombly and Iqbal invalidated Form 18). 
 89 See Elan Microelecs. Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531 RS, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83715, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2009) (“In the absence of any other form that 
addresses indirect infringement and is made binding on the courts through Rule 84, the 
Court must apply the teachings of Twombly and Iqbal.”); accord Weyer v. MySpace, 
Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00499-MRP-FFMx, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144008, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 
June 17, 2010); see also Medsquire, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at *7 (“Form 18 is 
inapplicable to claims of indirect or contributory infringement.”); Halton Co. v. Streivor, 
Inc., No. C 10-00655 WHA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50649, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 
2010) (“Nowhere in Form 18 are theories and elements of induced infringement or 
contributory infringement referenced.”). 
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the Federal Circuit addressed in In re Bill of Lading Transmission and 
Processing System Patent Litigation.90 
3. The Federal Circuit’s Choice: Endorsing the Legitimacy of Form 18 Under 
Rule 84 
Finally, the Federal Circuit stepped in to resolve diverging interpretations 
of Form 18. In In re Bill of Lading, a patentee sued defendants for induced and 
contributory infringement, and the district court dismissed the complaint in light 
of Twombly, concluding that it did not adequately plead direct infringement.91 
As direct infringement by a third party is a prerequisite for holding defendants 
liable for indirect infringement,92 the Federal Circuit first had to come up with 
the rule of pleading direct infringement and to revisit McZeal not in the pro se 
context. 
Reversing the district court’s judgment, the Federal Circuit emphasized 
that neither Twombly nor Iqbal addressed “the sufficiency of a complaint 
alleging patent infringement or causes of action for which there is a sample 
complaint in the Appendix of Forms.”93 Despite a likelihood that information 
just enough to fill out Form 18 may not be sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal,94 
the court declined to rewrite the text of Form 18, because such act would 
encroach on congressional authority.95 
In doing so, the Federal Circuit relied heavily on Rule 84,96 pursuant to 
the Supreme Court’s remark in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit that any changes “must be obtained by the 
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”97 
Consequently, the court held that the complaint has sufficiently pled direct 
infringement, because Form 18 does not require a patentee to identify which 
claims are being infringed.98 
  
 90 In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Lit. (R+L Carriers, Inc. v. 
DriverTech LLC), 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 91 Id. at 1330. 
 92 See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320, 1332 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009); Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 93 In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334. 
 94 Id. at 1334 n.6. 
 95 Id. at 1335 n.7. 
 96 See FED. R. CIV. P. 84; supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.  
 97 See In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)); accord McZeal 
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in 
part). 
 98 See In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1335–36. 
 




Additionally, the Federal Circuit concluded that a pleading of indirect 
infringement would be subject to Twombly’s plausibility standard, because Form 
18 is inapposite to indirect infringement.99 Therefore, In re Bill of Lading 
embraced a bipolar approach that Form 18 trumps Twombly on the pleading of 
direct infringement, while leaving matters of indirect infringement to the 
discretion of district courts with the instruction to follow Twombly.100 
In re Bill of Lading was dissented to even more vigorously than Judge 
Dyk’s dissent in McZeal. Dissenting in part, Judge Newman faulted the panel 
majority for “absolv[ing] patent infringement pleadings from the uniform 
requirements of the Federal Rules and Supreme Court precedent.”101 To Judge 
Newman, the majority’s position not only conflicts with Twombly’s mandate of 
“fair notice,” but also makes useless “judicial experience and common sense” of 
district courts.102 
Instead of Rule 84, what Judge Newman focused on is the purpose of the 
Federal Rules, i.e., to “provide a uniform procedure for all civil actions.”103 
Relatedly, it was precisely for that reason that Iqbal was unconvinced by the 
argument that the Twombly standard is limited to antitrust cases.104 Since Rule 8 
was designed to “establish uniform rules” for all civil cases except those subject 
to Rule 9,105 having samples attached for “illustration” should not release a 
limited number of causes of action from abiding by the fair notice principle. In 
any event, Judge Newman emphasized, there is no such “special” treatment.106 
To add more weight to Judge Newman’s dissent, the majority’s reliance 
on Leatherman in warning against judicial activism seems misplaced.107 At issue 
in Leatherman’s reference to Rule 9 was whether judicial authority can broaden 
  
 99 See id. at 1336 (“The Forms are controlling only for causes of action for which 
there are sample pleadings.”). 
 100 The Federal Circuit has since upheld the precedential value of In re Bill of Lading. 
See K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013); see also Superior Indus., LLC v. Thor Global Enters. Ltd., 700 F.3d 1287, 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (considering Form 18 as controlling, even where parties did not 
discuss Form 18). But cf. In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1350 (Newman, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part) (“[T]he Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, for example, 
has called the Form 18 complaint for patent infringement an embarrassment.”).  
 101 In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1347. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1348 (emphasis added). 
 104 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (noting that Twombly was based on the 
interpretation and application of Rule 8). 
 105 In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Judge William D. Mitchell’s 
statement at the time of drafting the Forms).  
 106 Id. at 1350 (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1221, at 292). 
 107 See id. at 1334 (majority opinion); supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
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the subject of Rule 9.108 In addressing Leatherman in its footnote 14, Twombly 
did not disagree with Leatherman’s conclusion that any “heightened” pleading 
standard under Rule 9 can be achieved only through the amendment process 
initiated by Congress.109 
Importantly, Twombly in the same footnote added that being 
“particularized” under Rule 9 is not a synonym for being “plausible” under Rule 
8, although they can share the same triggering condition—“a high risk of 
abusive litigation.”110 Thus, when the courts witness certain abusive litigation 
tactics in the form of discovery abuse or frivolous claims, a searching inquiry for 
plausibility becomes increasingly more important. As Judge Newman pointed 
out, Twombly and Iqbal carved out no exception for pleading patent 
infringement. 
B. Form 18 and Patent Assertion Entities 
Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) refers to a “firm[] whose business model 
primarily focuses on purchasing and asserting patents” against practicing 
firms.111 Patent enforcement is at the center of its business model, seeking 
royalty payments from accused infringers by demanding a license or threatening 
to bring a lawsuit when a negotiation fails.112 Counteractions are of little avail to 
accused infringers because PAEs do not usually manufacture any commercial 
product.113 Advocates have argued that PAEs “give the little guy a chance,” and 
play a crucial role in providing small inventors with due compensation.114 
  
 108 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) (quoting 
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993)). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id.; see also supra Part I.B. (discussing Twombly’s premise that particularity is not 
a synonym of plausibility). 
 111 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 IP REPORT], available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf. The term “NPE” includes a 
patent owner who develops and transfers technology (e.g., universities), and PAEs do not 
include this group of NPEs. See id. 
 112 See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(characterizing PAEs as “exploit[ing] the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract 
a nuisance value settlement” from accused infringers (emphasis added)). See also Colleen 
Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 484 (2014).  
 113 See 2011 IP REPORT, supra note 111, at 223. 
 114 Public Comments of IPNav at 1, Patent Assertion Entity Activities Workshop 
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-
0010.pdf. All public comments submitted in response to the 2012 PAE Workshop are 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/#comments. More than 90% 
of 68 public comments are supportive of the efforts to curb PAEs, requesting actions on 
the part of the DOJ and the FTC. 
 




The advent of PAEs dates back to the mid-2000s, and their business 
model has since evolved to capitalize on the IP transaction market.115 One recent 
trend is to increasingly target small businesses and end-users. While the main 
target in the past was large operating firms, PAEs in 2012 initiated more than 
60% of all patent litigation suits and sued more non-tech companies than tech 
companies.116 Such non-tech companies include hotels, coffee shops, restaurants, 
supermarkets, funeral homes, advertising agencies, and other retailers.117 
Clueless on how to handle patent litigation, many small business owners 
will decide that it is cheaper to pay up-front than to fight.118 Those who fight 
back, if successful, can vindicate their business integrity, but they must “spend[] 
millions of dollars and years in court.”119 The fight, on occasion, saves the whole 
industry by invalidating key patents being asserted, but sometimes even legally 
sophisticated firms choose to settle rather than to face trial.120 Overall, the 
  
 115 See 2011 IP REPORT, supra note 111, at 63. 
 116 Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 08-13, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233041.  
 117 See id.; see also In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Pat. Lit., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 
906 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Innovatio sued numerous hotels, coffee shops, restaurants, 
supermarkets, and other commercial users of Wi-Fi technology, alleging that, by making 
the wireless Internet available to their customers, they infringed Innovatio’s seventeen 
patents. Id.  
 118 Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Patent Troll Innovatio IP Goes After Small Businesses, 
ZDNET (Oct. 5, 2011, 8:03 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/open-source/patent-troll-
innovatio-ip-goes-after-small-businesses/9681. 
 119 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 4 (June 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc. is illustrative of what it takes to fight PAEs. 836 
F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Tex. 2010), rev’d in part, 705 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013), reh’g 
granted and amended by 728 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 910 (2014). Soverain (PAE) sued Newegg for patent infringement over the use of 
online “shopping cart” technology, and the jury awarded $2.5 million judgment against 
Newegg. 836 F. Supp. 2d at 467–68. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, finding the 
patent invalid for obviousness, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in January 2014. 
Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 910 (2014). 
 120 With the same set of patents, Soverain has filed numerous patent lawsuits against 
online retailers; Amazon is reported to settle for $40 million, another ordered to pay $18 
million, and the others waiting for trials. See Public Comments of Nat’l Retail Fed’n at 
3–4, Patent Assertion Entity Activities Workshop (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0057.pdf; see also Joe 
Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent Troll and Saved Online 
Retail, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and-saved-online-retail/. 
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number of possible recipients of demand letters makes the PAEs’ business 
model profitable.121 
The White House’s announcement on June 4, 2013 devoted most of its 
pages to calling on Congress and executive agencies to help curb PAEs’ 
“abusive suits” and to empower small businesses and downstream users.122 Even 
before the White House’s move, a variety of measures in an effort to tackle 
PAEs have been proposed or already enacted by a united front of legislative and 
administrative branches.123 
PAEs are uniquely situated to gain maximum benefits from the minimal 
pleading requirement set forth in Form 18 for the same reasons that Twombly 
called for plausibility. First, Form 18 plainly lacks enough information to put 
accused infringers on “fair notice” as to what to answer.124 Just as defendants in 
Twombly were forced to investigate whether their “parallel conduct” might be in 
fact illegal, accused infringers are forced to study, with or without lawyers, 
whether the accused device is actually infringing asserted patent claim(s). 
Second, once having past the pleading stage, accused infringers are very likely 
to experience growing pressures to settle the case, as legal expense increases 
  
 121 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 119, at 10. 
 122 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: White 
House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues 2–3 (June 4, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-
force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
 123 E.g., America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. §§ 299, 321 (2012) (creating post-
grant review of business method patents and providing a new procedural rule of joinder); 
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. 
§ 2 (2013) (introducing “Loser Pays” rule); Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 
113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (extending the term and subject of the AIA’s post-grant review); 
End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (requiring disclosure 
and recordation of ownership, real party-in-interest, and transfers and assignments of 
patent ownership); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013 §§ 2–5 (2013) (raising the 
pleading standard of patent infringement, imposing discovery limits and joinder limits, 
and adopting “Loser Pays” rule); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
13-465, PATENT LITIGATION: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 41 (2013) (reporting that the USPTO 
is currently wrapping up the rulemaking process to provide greater transparency on patent 
ownership). 
 124 See, e.g., McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(Dyk, J., concurring in part) (“In my view, a bare allegation of literal infringement using 
[Form 18] is inadequate to provide sufficient notice to an accused infringer under a 
theory of literal infringement.”). 
 




exponentially at the discovery stage.125 Third, PAEs are well placed to leverage 
“asymmetry” in discovery costs because a PAE by nature will generate far fewer 
documents during its course of business.126 
In addition to the rationales stated in Twombly, what makes patent 
infringement defendants more vulnerable than antitrust defendants is the strict-
liability nature of direct infringement.127 As opposed to plaintiffs in Twombly 
who have to show defendants’ meeting of minds, PAEs can expose accused 
infringers to potential liability simply by sending a letter of notice (demand 
letter).128 Because PAEs are not incentivized to disclose details of information, 
their demand letters typically lack transparency.129 Moreover, because filing a 
Form 18 complaint constitutes such notice under section 287(a),130 PAEs will 
likely take the position that any demand letter, even with little detail, is 
legitimate so long as it bears resemblance to Form 18.131 Summarizing all of 
these features of the PAEs’ playing field, either closely related to Twombly or 
uniquely attributed to PAEs, they are all channeling into one observation—a 
high risk of abusive litigation in the form of discovery abuse.132 
  
 125 Randall R. Rader, C.J., C.A.F.C., E.D. Texas Judicial Conference: The State of 
Patent Litigation 7 (Sept. 27, 2011) 
http://www.patentlyo.com/files/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf (identifying the primary problem 
of patent litigation as “disproportionately high discovery expenses”). Compare AIPLA, 
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 35 (2011) (estimating litigation cost as ranging 
from a median of $650,000 for smaller cases, to a median of over $5 million per case), 
with AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007 25 (2007) (reporting that the 
median cost of discovery is between $350,000 and $3,000,000 in 2007). 
 126 Joshua Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Dechert Client 
Annual Antitrust Spring Seminar: What Role Should Antitrust Play in Regulating the 
Activities of Patent Assertion Entities? 6 (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/wright/130417paespeech.pdf; see also Patent Abuse 
Reduction Act, S. 1013 § 4 (imposing discovery limits in patent litigation). 
 127 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating 
that patent infringement is a strict liability offense). 
 128 See 35 U.S.C § 287(a) (2012) (“In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall 
be recovered . . . except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement.” 
(emphasis added)). Because they do not offer commercial products, PAEs must notify 
accused infringers of infringement to recover damages. 
 129 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 122, at 2 (one of seven 
legislative recommendations is to require demand letter “transparency” to help curb 
abusive suits).  
 130 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (“Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute such 
notice.”).  
 131 Relatedly, the Federal Circuit has set a low bar on the requirement of actual notice. 
See, e.g., Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A]s long as the 
communication from the patentee provides sufficient specificity regarding its belief that 
the recipient may be an infringer, the statutory requirement of actual notice is met.”). 
 132 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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III. RECONCILING PATENT PLEADINGS AND TWOMBLY: THE “BROADEST 
POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION” STANDARD 
As Judge Dyk in McZeal pointed out, Form 18 is devoid of the 
requirement to identify which patent claims are asserted and how the accused 
device reads on the claims.133 Given the high risk of abusive litigation, one 
measure to strike balance between Twombly and patent pleadings is to require a 
patentee to articulate some “plausibility” of infringement, for example, by 
attaching a claim chart construed under the “broadest possible construction.” 
The “broadest possible construction” standard comports well with the normal 
pleading standard because it can function similar to “assumption of truth.” 
By doing so, patent pleadings of direct infringement can adhere to 
Twombly. Reliance on Form 18 is misplaced for the following reasons. First, 
under the construction of Federal Circuit laws, patent infringement at the 
pleading stage is a quasi-fact question that sufficient factual allegations must be 
pled to show a plausible entitlement to relief. Second, a “showing” of Rule 8 
always demands plausibility because the technicality of Form 18 cannot override 
the general, uniform objective of Rule 8. Finally, the time has come to revisit the 
legitimacy of Form 18 now that judicial experience dealing with patent 
infringement outdates Form 18. 
A. Patent Infringement at the Pleading Stage Is a Quasi-Fact Question that 
Sufficient Factual Allegations Must Be Pled to Show a Plausible Entitlement to 
Relief. 
Under Twombly, in assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, only factual 
allegations are entitled to the assumption of truth, and Iqbal has directed lower 
courts to disregard legal allegations.134 Relatedly, patent infringement is a two-
step inquiry consisting of claim construction and the determination of whether 
an accused product meets every limitation of the claim as constructed.135 The 
first step is a question of law;136 the second step is a question of fact.137 It follows 
that the hearing for claim construction (Markman hearing) must predate 
conclusions of any infringement inquiry. However, although claim construction 
is inapposite at the pleading stage, it does not necessarily absolve a patent 
  
 133 McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 134 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 135 Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  
 136 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–90 (1996) (holding 
that claim interpretation is a question of law because of the importance of uniformity and 
functional considerations). 
 137 RF Del., Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 




plaintiff of a burden of pleading facts adequate to show a “plausible” 
infringement claim. 
Importantly, In re Bill of Lading alluded in a footnote that claims at the 
pleading stage are afforded the “broadest possible construction.”138 A patentee is 
then allowed to lay out its version of claim construction as broadly as possible to 
capture the accused devices.139 Subsequently, a pleading of facts to show that an 
accused device falls within such broadly outlined claims is entitled to the 
assumption of truth. 
This “broadest possible construction” standard, while related to a question 
of law, echoes well with “the assumption of truth.” Federal Circuit law might 
seem contradictory, because, while being a question of law, claim construction 
at the pleading stage is afforded the broadest possible construction, which 
sounds very much like assumption of truth, despite that assumption of truth is 
available only to a pleading of facts. However, because of the unique mixture of 
fact and law, the allegation of infringement under Form 18 that an accused 
device is “embodying the patent” cannot be aptly characterized as a mere legal 
conclusion either.140 
As such, the Federal Circuit seems willing to set aside the fact-law 
dichotomy, where bifurcating fact and law is next to impossible.141 The bottom 
line for this quasi-factual inquiry is that the room in which a patentee is allowed 
to maneuver for its “broadest possible construction” is more than sufficient to 
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Therefore, any attempt to immunize Form 18 
from Twombly not only runs counter to the mandate of fair notice, but also 
leaves neglected a duty of pleading that is easy to fulfill in good faith. 
B. A “Showing” of Rule 8 Always Demands Plausibility Because the 
Technicality of Form 18 Cannot Override the General, Uniform Objective of 
Rule 8. 
In the realm of Twombly, any pleading inquiry must be committed to the 
guiding principle under Rule 8 that a “showing” of facts suggestive of a 
plausible claim serves the purpose of giving a defendant “fair notice” of the 
  
 138 In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Lit., 681 F.3d 1323, 1343 
n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“We afford the claims their broadest possible construction at this 
stage.” (emphasis added)). 
 139 It is important that this lenient construction may not go beyond the pleading stage. 
Trial courts will likely be conducting the Markman hearing anew without deference. 
 140 But cf. K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1288 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (Wallach, J., concurring) (opining that the allegation that defendant “is 
infringing” a patent seems to be a legal conclusion that the court is instructed to disregard 
under Twombly). However, Judge Wallach may not fully discuss factual components 
regarding the language “embody” in Form 18 that a patentee must plead to show a 
plausible claim. 
 141 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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allegations.142 None of the Justices in Twombly disagreed as to this general 
objective of Rule 8.143 If bound by Twombly’s interpretation of Rule 8, 
plausibility is always required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.144 
Conversely, the technicality of Form 18 serves the purpose of 
“illustration” in view of the statement made at the time of drafting: “The 
following forms are intended for illustration only.”145 As the D.C. Circuit 
commented, the Forms are illustrative of details that are sufficient, on the 
assumption that they give a defendant fair notice of a claim against him.146 And 
the vitality of that assumption hinges on the uncontestable fact that “patents, 
technology, and litigation were generally less complex” at the time of drafting 
Form 18.147 
Because that assumption no longer holds true in view of the complexity 
of modern technologies, the Form ought to give way to the fundamental 
principle of fair notice. The text of Rule 84 cannot be dispositive because Rule 
8, along with Rule 84, was adopted to establish “a uniform system for all 
cases,”148 and the unconditional allegiance to Form 18 is at the opposite of what 
“uniformity” stands for now. A practical technique to master a rule cannot trump 
the general, uniform objective of that rule. 
Although Twombly did not question the sufficiency of Form 9,149 there are 
compelling reasons for the Supreme Court to view Form 18 differently. 
Needless to say, under the basic principle of pleading, a patentee bears a burden 
of alleging “facts” in support of infringement.150 Because patent infringement is 
a question of both fact and law, the Court would not accord the pure “legal” 
status to Form 18’s allegation of infringement as it did to Form 9’s allegation of 
negligence.151 
On the policy side, the Court will take note of the imbalance between 
Form 18 and the public’s entitlement to sufficient “notice” as to the scope of a 
patent. A patent claim sets forth “the metes and bounds” of a right to exclude,152 
  
 142 See supra Part I.C. 
 143 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
 144 Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d at 1287 (Wallach, J., concurring). 
 145 Introductory Statement, App’x of Forms, 28 U.S.C. app. at 282 (2006) (emphasis 
added); see also In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Lit., 681 F.3d 
1323, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting in part). 
 146 Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). 
 147 In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis added). 
 148 Id. at 1349. 
 149 See supra Part I.C. 
 150 Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244, 248 (1894). 
 151 Compare discussion supra Part III.A., with supra text accompanying notes 54–60 
(discussing the issue regarding Form 9 that Justice Stevens raised in his dissent). 
 152 Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
 




while what is not claimed is dedicated to the public.153 Also, a patent is granted 
in return for its meaningful disclosure of a novel and useful invention that 
“give[s] public notice of the subject matter that is protected.”154 
This process of public notice must be bilateral, not unilateral, considering 
“information asymmetry” between the public and patent holders.155 While it is 
usually an infringer who knows more about infringing products,156 a patentee is 
irrefutably in the best position to know the metes and bounds of its claim. It is 
all the more so because a patentee is statutorily required to “possess” its claim 
within “the four corners of the specification” building upon its knowledge in the 
prior art and prosecution history.157 The specification is “always highly relevant” 
and is the single best guide in claim construction.158 Thus, the legitimacy of 
Form 18 depends in part on how well it can mediate this information asymmetry 
while ensuring transparency of information. 
However, it is obvious that Form 18 tips the balance heavily in favor of 
the plaintiff. Form 18 is utterly deficient in critical information, not even 
requiring a patentee to specify which claim is allegedly being infringed, despite 
the fact that, in the last decade, the average number of claims per patent is more 
than fifteen.159  
Furthermore, while the court gave leeway to information on the plaintiff’s 
side regarding patent claims by allowing the “broadest possible construction” 
standard,160 information on the defendant’s side, such as on accused products, is 
not a meaningful variable in the equation. For example, in K-Tech 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., the district court 
dismissed a complaint on the ground that it failed to identify the accused device 
  
 153 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614 (1950) (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
 154 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added); see also id. (“We and the Supreme Court have frequently used the 
term ‘public notice’ in connection with claims . . . the point being that the public is 
entitled to notice of what the inventor has claimed.”). 
 155 Christine Meyer, Vice President, NERA Econ. Consulting, Economists’ 
Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, in 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG. 10, 18 
(2013), available at http://www.edgewortheconomics.com/files/documents/ 
Greg_in_Antitrust_Journal_Roundtable_Article.pdf. 
 156 Id. 
 157 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 158 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 159 Dennis Crouch, Claims in Issued Patents, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 22, 2013, 10:05 
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/02/claims-in-issued-patents.html. 
 160 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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by name or model number.161 In reviving the case, however, the Federal Circuit 
held that in a Form 18 complaint, a plaintiff need not so identify the accused 
device,162 reasoning that an infringer should not be able to shield itself from 
liability by operating in “secrecy.”163 Therefore, Form 18 aids little in making 
the process of public notice bilateral, and only serves as a meaningless bar 
against frivolous pleadings at the expense of the public’s entitlement to notice.164 
C.  The Time Has Come to Revisit the Legitimacy of Form 18 Now that 
Judicial Experience Dealing with Patent Infringement Outdates Form 18. 
At the heart of disputes surrounding Form 18 is to what extent, if any, 
district courts can allow a patentee to construct claims at the pleading stage. 
Although the Federal Circuit mentioned in passing the “broadest possible 
construction,” no construction is theoretically necessary under Form 18’s 
template because it spares no paragraph for factual allegations as to how the 
accused device, “electric motor,” meets each claim limitation. 
Since its inception, claim construction has consistently been thought of as 
an “elusive” task to district courts and practitioners alike.165 The Federal Circuit 
reviews a district court’s claim construction without deference. This de novo 
standard has been under criticism because the standard allegedly leads to “a 
steadily high reversal rate” and “a lack of predictability about appellate 
outcome.”166 The debate over the proper standard of review continues to date.167 
This lack of early certainty, combined with Form 18’s silence as to patent 
claims, may explain in part a district court’s hesitance to construct claims, 
however minimal, at the pleading stage. Additionally, because the Markman 
  
 161 K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1280 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). But cf. Enlink Geoenergy Servs., Inc. v. Jackson & Sons Drilling & Pump, 
Inc., No. C 09-03524 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37859, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 
2010) (suggesting that Form 18 requires a plaintiff to identify the accused device, 
“electric motors”). 
 162 Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d at 1286. Accord Realtime Data, LLC v. Stanley, 721 
F. Supp. 2d 538, 539 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (clarifying that the court has not required a 
specific identification of accused products).  
 163 Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d at 1286. 
 164 Accord McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, 
J., concurring in part) (“In my view, a bare allegation of literal infringement using [Form 
18] is inadequate to provide sufficient notice to an accused infringer under a theory of 
literal infringement.”). 
 165 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(Newman, J., dissenting from the pronouncements on claim interpretation).  
 166 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Michel, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
 167 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (affirming the standard of de novo review in claim 
construction). 
 




hearing is inappropriate at the pleading stage, a district court may be 
comfortable giving the benefit of the doubt to patentees to the extent possible, 
thereby allowing patent cases to reach the discovery stage. However, even an 
“early” Markman hearing is not early in a practical sense for the purpose of 
safeguarding defendants from non-meritorious claims, because it occurs after the 
“expensive” discovery stage.168 
Relatedly, in support of the holding that claim construction is a question 
of law for a judge to decide, the Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
emphasized “the importance of uniformity” in patent cases, fearing that 
uniformity will be ill-served if juries decide the meaning of a disputed claim 
term.169 Then the question to ask now is whether more than a decade and a half 
of judicial experience dealing with claim construction is enough to draw any 
“empirically sound conclusions” as to uniformity.170 
One empirical study documenting data from 2000 through 2011 suggests 
that the claim construction reversal rate has dropped remarkably, from 37.2% to 
24.0%, since the Federal Circuit’s 2005 en banc ruling in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
which set forth the important claim construction guidelines for district courts.171 
This current rate stands for even more dramatic improvement when compared to 
the rate “hovering near 50%” in the year the Markman hearing was first 
introduced.172 Moreover, judicial experience here need not be extensive. Because 
a district court’s adjudication on pleadings is to be reviewed by the “broadest 
possible construction” standard under the regional circuit law,173 free from de 
novo constraints, only frivolous pleadings may not pass this deferential standard. 
Given these statistics and standard of review, the Federal Circuit’s 
adherence to the text of Form 18 might be misplaced.174 Such bipolar 
characterization that Twombly comes into play only when the Forms are silent 
  
 168 See Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, No. 6:10cv111, 2011 WL 
3609292, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2011) (recognizing the importance of conducting an 
early Markman hearing). 
 169 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996). 
 170 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463 (Plager, J., concurring). 
 171 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
40 (2013). 
 172 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting) (indicating that the Federal Circuit’s 
official 1997 statistics showed “53%” in the claim construction reversal rate). 
 173 See supra text accompanying note 69 (on appellate review, the Federal Circuit in 
McZeal applied the law of the regional circuit, not the Federal Circuit law); McZeal v. 
Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Bayer Schering Pharma 
AG v. Lupin, Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting); see 
also Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e 
will apply our own law to both substantive and procedural issues intimately involved in 
the substance of enforcement of the patent right.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 174 See supra Part II.A.3. 
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stifles useful resources and know-how accumulated for more than a decade in 
the hands of trial judges. Furthermore, it plainly leaves unfulfilled the 
Twombly/Iqbal mandate that a pleading inquiry is “a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.”175 The consequence of having Form 18 unrefined by the Twombly 
interpretation of Rule 8 is to practically allow every patent case asserting direct 
infringement to propel forward and entertain discovery, in the face of a high risk 
of abusive litigation. 
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of Form 18 seems more striking when 
viewed in contrast to other areas of patent pleading jurisprudence. The first 
example is design patents. In Colida v. Nokia, Inc., a pro se plaintiff sued Nokia 
for infringing his design patents, and the district court dismissed the complaint, 
finding infringement implausible.176 The district court additionally imposed 
sanctions on the plaintiff, reasoning that a series of his “meritless” lawsuits 
warranted an “anti-filing injunction.”177 
Affirming both judgments, the Federal Circuit in Colida applied 
Twombly’s plausibility test and concluded that infringement is “facially 
implausible.”178 In doing so, the court noted that no argument was made about 
Form 18, while equivocating over whether it is of any use for design patents.179 
Here, the Federal Circuit approved the trial judge’s visual examination of 
designs drawing upon judicial experience and common sense,180 although the 
text of Form 18 does not limit its subjects to utility patents.181 Even the 
plaintiff’s pro se status did not help the case.182 
Another example is patent eligibility under section 101.183 In Bancorp 
Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, the Federal Circuit 
signaled to the district courts that they need not undertake claim construction 
before examining patent eligibility.184 Citing Bilski v. Kappos,185 the court noted 
  
 175 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 176 Colida v. Nokia, Inc., 347 F. App’x 568, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  
 177 Id. at 571. 
 178 Id. at 570. 
 179 Id. at 571 n.2. Contra Superior Indus., LLC v. Thor Global Enters. Ltd., 700 F.3d 
1287, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (considering Form 18 sua sponte even where parties do not 
discuss Form 18). 
 180 Colida, 347 F. App’x at 570–71. 
 181 Languages in Form 18 including “invention” and “letters patent” are universal 
terms in both utility and design patents. See 35 U.S.C § 171 (2012). The design of 
“electric motors” can be protected by design patents as well. 
 182 Colida, 347 F. App’x 568. But cf. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 
1356 (“[T]he pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to a lesser standard.”). 
 183 35 U.S.C § 101 (2006).  
 184 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 185 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 




that the Supreme Court in Bilski found ineligible the subject matter at issue 
without engaging in claim construction.186 Taking up this message, several 
district courts have since resolved subject matter eligibility at the motion to 
dismiss stage.187 
The last example lies at the intersection of patent and antitrust laws. An 
antitrust counterclaim is one of a few defenses available to an accused infringer, 
including sham litigation and Walker Process fraud.188 However, for these 
counterclaims to be of any merit, accused infringers must hurdle a high standard 
of proof. A counterclaim of sham litigation requires an accused infringer to 
show that the patentee was “both objectively baseless and subjectively motivated 
by a desire to impose . . . anti-competitive injury.”189 For a Walker Process fraud 
counterclaim, an accused infringer must successfully show that the patentee 
committed a “knowing and willful fraud.”190 Accordingly, as Judge Posner puts 
it, “some threshold of plausibility” must be crossed on the face of these 
counterclaims.191 Again, the underlying concern is “inevitably costly and 
protracted discovery.”192 
One way to strike a balance between the three examples above and patent 
pleading under Form 18 is to require a patent plaintiff to articulate some level of 
plausibility of infringement by attaching a simple claim chart construed under 
  
 186 Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1273. But cf. id. at 1273–74 (cautioning that conducting claim 
construction prior to the section 101 inquiry would be desirable). 
 187 See, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l 
Ass’n, No. 12-2501 (MAS)(TJB), 2013 WL 3964909, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2013); 
Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., No. C 12-04182 WHA, 2013 WL 245026, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013).  
 188 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 189 Id. at 1071 (emphasis in original) (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 62 (1993)).  
 190 Id. at 1068 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172, 177 (1965)). 
 191 Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(Posner, J., sitting by designation) (“[T]o avoid turning every patent case into antitrust 
case, some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust 
case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 192 Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007) (citing Asahi 
Glass with approval). 
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the “broadest possible construction.”193 Patentees will likely argue against such a 
requirement, as claim construction is exclusively handled through Markman 
proceedings, which typically are not conducted until after discovery. However, 
patentees, armed with “the possession” of the scope of claims,194 bear the initial 
burden of alleging infringement. Disparate treatment in favor of one side against 
the other is unwarranted because both patent and antitrust claims can equally 
pose a high risk of abusive litigation and discovery abuse. 
As this article was being prepared for publication, Judge Robert E. Payne 
in the Eastern District Court of Virginia dismissed a complaint satisfying Form 
18 for failure to comply with Twombly and Iqbal.195 In noting that patent claims 
may pose a higher risk of “extensive discovery and high litigation costs” than 
antitrust claims, Judge Payne reasoned: 
Finally, to exempt patent complaints from the requirements of 
Twombly and Iqbal is to ignore a fundamental rationale that underpins 
those decisions. In Twombly, the Supreme Court made clear that the more 
rigorous application of Rule 8(a) was needed to assure that the parties 
would not embark on expensive litigation unless the plaintiff had made in 
the complaint a plausible case. 
Twombly was an antitrust case, a kind of litigation well-known for 
extensive discovery and high litigation costs. Patent cases fit the same bill, 
perhaps even more so. Indeed, patent cases generally are among the most 
expensive kinds of cases in federal court. It is not logical to exempt them 
from the reach of Twombly and Iqbal, whose prime purpose was to assure 
that such expense was not incurred unless the plaintiff had posited a 
plausible claim in the complaint.196 
Of particular note is how Judge Payne took issue with McZeal and In re 
Bill of Lading, saying that “they accord no force to either the text or teaching of 
Twombly and Iqbal which require more to plead a legally sufficient claim than is 
set out in Form 18.”197 Thus, the same observations were made by this article 
  
 193 A group of district courts have raised the pleading bar. See, e.g., Eastern District of 
Texas Patent Rule 3-1; Northern District of California Patent Rule 3-1; Northern District 
of Georgia Patent Rule 3.1; Northern District of Illinois Patent Rule 2.2; District of New 
Jersey Patent Rule 3.1. In those jurisdictions, a claim chart prior to discovery is routinely 
required. See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. (McZeal II), 335 F. App’x 966, 969 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). Local patent rules requiring initial infringement contentions in the form of a 
claim chart are deemed valid, so long as they do not conflict with the discovery regime 
under the Federal Rules. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 
1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 194 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 195 Macronix Int’l Co. v. Spansion Inc., No. 3:13CV679, 2014 WL 934505 (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 10, 2014) (order granting motion to dismiss direct infringement claims). 
 196 Id. at *6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 197 Id. at *4. 
 




and Judge Payne as to a high risk of discovery abuse arising from litigating 
patent cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Patentees should not be discouraged from exercising patent enforcement 
rights as rooted in the IP Clause of the Constitution,198 just because the case may 
turn out to be less meritorious than expected later during trial. However, a patent 
grant does not necessarily mean giving free rein to patent holders either, given 
the “infirmities in the definition and scope” of patent rights.199 
Asking no more than what is recited in Form 18 comes close to insulating 
patent pleadings from the benefit of judicial experience in the hands of district 
judges dealing with patent infringement, even where the central concern of 
Twombly, i.e., discovery abuse, remains in full force. In this situation, the 
Federal Circuit’s endorsement of Form 18 for the reason that Twombly does not 
apply when a sample complaint form is provided is misguided. 
We may not need to wrestle with how to shape a rule conforming to both 
Rule 8 and Twombly, because the rule, albeit in a footnote,200 is already in place. 
Requiring a claim chart construed under the “broadest possible construction” 
will be a meaningful step toward reconciling Twombly and patent pleadings 
beyond the text of Form 18, without undermining the “elementary” principle of 
pleadings that the burden of alleging facts is upon the plaintiff.201 
  
 198 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 199 Ted Voorhees, Quality Check – Connect the Dots from IP to Merger 
Retrospectives, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST MAG. 3, 3 (2013) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 749, 754 (2011)); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 
2231 (2013) (“[T]he patent here may or may not be valid, and may or may not be 
infringed. . . . But an invalidated patent carries with it no such right [to exclude].”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 200 In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Lit., 681 F.3d 1323, 1343 
n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 201 Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244, 248 (1894). 
